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FOREWORD 
This paper was prepared for Project VULCAN, a study 
of .. Arms Control and a Stable Military Environment, which 
was made by the Special Studies Group of IDA for the 
Department of State under contract No. SCC 28270, dated 
24 February 1961. Dr. J. I. Coffey was the Project 
Leader. 
The author, Morton H. Halperin, a consultant to the 
Special Studies Group, has done research in the fields 
of arms control and limited warfare. He 'is a Research 
Fellow of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard 
University and a consultant to the RAND Corporation. 
Judgments expressed are of course the author's and 
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute for 
Defense Analyses or of any agency of the United States 
Goverrunent. 
JAMES E. KING, JR. 
Associate Director of Research 
iii 
SUMMARY 
The basic purpose of the proposal to ban the use of nuclear 
weapons is to reduce the likelihood that they will be used in 
any war., and particularly in a local war. Such a ban would not 
seek to reduce the capability of the major powers to use nuclear 
weapons in a local war or a strategic war. Rather, it would 
seek to reinforce their present disposition not to use these 
weapons in a local war. A ban on the use of nuclear weapons 
would also help to slow the spread of such weapons to non-nuclear 
powers. 
Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union has ever used nuclear 
weapons in a local war. This fact as well as analysis of the 
possible uses of nuclear weapons suggests their lack of utility 
to either side. Both sides probably appreciate the contribution 
non-use makes to stability at the local war level. There is now 
a tacit and informal agreement not to use nuclear weapons. 
There is a net advantage to the United States to transform 
this tacit understanding into a formal agreement. A formal 
treaty would strengthen present practice by spelling out the 
risk for the decision-maker. It would increase confidence on 
both sides that nuclear war was neither imminent nor inevitable. 
This confidence could help to dampen the pre-emptive urge 0 
The real worth of an agreement to ban the use of nuclear 
weapons would depend to a very great extent on the nature of the 
arms control measures and unilateral steps taken concurrently 
with it. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
There are a number of ways in which one can study the prob-
lems of arms control. One of these is to analyze particular 
arms control proposals and to explore their implications. Even 
in trying to examine a particular arms control proposal there 
are several different ways in which one can approach the 
problem. One can posit a particular proposal in some detail 
and then attempt to explore its implications; alternatively, 
one can state a particular problem (for example, the Nth 
country problem) and then seek to evaluate proposals which 
deal with it. Finally one can look at arms control proposals 
in relation to areas, for example NATO, space, or the control 
of missiles. This paper will attempt to explore a particular 
arms control proposal, specifically the implications and 
problems in the adoption of a proposal banning the use of 
nuclear weapons. l Even this particular proposal might be 
lThis proposal is frequently stated as "the non-first use" 
of nuclear weapons." The purpose of stating it this way 
seems to be to affirm the point that if one side uses nuclear 
weapons, the other is free to do so; however, this point seems 
obvious and there are certain unfortunate implications in 
stating it explicitly. It is certainly always true that if one 
side breaks an agreement, the other is also free to, and in 
fact is likely to do so. But to state it this way keeps 
sharply in mind the possibility of violation and, in fact, seems 
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adopted in a number of different ways ranging from an informal 
commitment of each side to a formal negotiated international 
treatYe 2 The best way of establishing this arms control rule 
will be discussed below. 
This approach, of stating a particular proposal and then 
exploring its implications, seems to be particularly valuable 
when the proposal has been discussed and negotiated between the 
two sides. For example, in studying the possibility of a ban 
on nuclear testing, it seems most desirable to consider the 
implications of the proposals introduced by the two sides at 
Geneva, rather than some "ideal" nuclear test ban. The proposal 
for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons has been made frequently 
by the Soviet Union, and it is important to study its implica-
tions rather than (or in addition to) the implications of some 
alternate proposals to meet the same goals. 
In suggesting that the United States adopt a particular 
arms control proposal and seek to implement it, it is important 
to make clear first what the goals of the proposal are; then 
to explore its other implications, and in particular, the costs 
involved in its adoption, and to suggest what complementary 
steps might reduce its costs and enhance its value; 'finally, 
to indicate in what way the United States should go about 
seeking to establish the particular arms control rule. This 
paper will seek to deal with each of these in turn. 
to sanction the breaking of the agreement. For this reason, 
the proposal is here discussed as the non-use of nuclear 
weapons, although in effect the two proposals are the same. 
2The United States might make a unilateral commitment 
not to use nuclear weapons. In this case its commitment would 
have to be not to introduce nuclear weapons (i.e., no first 
use) . 
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CHAPTER II 
OBJECTIVES 
A major purpose of the proposal to ban the use of nuclear 
weapons is to reduce the likelihood that nuclear weapons will 
be used in war, and particularly in local waro It is not at 
all clear that even the formal adoption of this proposal by 
the United States and the Soviet Union would substantially 
reduce the likelihood that nuclear weapons would be used in 
a local war. Unlike an agreement which eliminates capability 
and provides an inspection system which indicates that the 
capability has been eliminated, the adoption of this proposal 
would not have any effect on the capability of the two sides 
to use nuclear weapons in a local war. If it is to have 
effect, then, it must affect their intentions and expectations. 
There is a second and perhaps equally important goal 
wh~ch might be furthered by the adoption of a proposal against 
the use of nuclear weapons. This is the slowing down or 
halting of the spread of nuclear weapons to other countriesQ 
How this proposal might affect the spread of nuclear weapons 
is perhaps not as obvious as its contribution to the first 
goal. It nevertheless might be one of the important effects 
of the proposal, and it seems to be one of the important 
reasons for advocating it. 
Finally, one must add the goal of contributing to the 
likelihood of additional arms control measures. To some people 
any limited proposal, particularly one that seems to have a high 
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probability of adoption if the United States advocates it, is 
of value because it may contribute to further arms control. 
The argument here is that every agreement established increases 
the likelihood of future agreements and that such future 
agreements are desirable. The argument is somewhat diluted 
in relation to the proposal against the non-first use of 
nuclear weapons, since such a scheme would not in itself call 
for the establishment of any prototype international inspec-
tion organization 0 Nevertheless, just by increasing the 
awareness of both sides of the possibility of arms control 
arrangements and perhaps by increasing their estimate of their 
desirability, the proposal might be a valuable step towards 
additional arms control measures. 
I turn then to the political and military evaluation of a 
proposal banning the use of nuclear weapons. Attempting to 
evaluate the adoption of this proposal, one is faced with the 
recurring problem that it depends on what other political and 
military measures are taken. The impact of the proposal on 
America's military and international political posture depends 
on what other arms control and political and military steps 
are taken. Certain steps might enhance the value of the proposal, 
reduce the costs of adopting it, and increase the likelihood of 
its effectiveness. Other actions, if they are not coordinated 
with arms control policy, might negate the value of the proposal 
and increase its costs. 
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CHAPTER III 
MILITARY EVALUATION 
NUCLEAR LOCAL WAR 
The question of whether the non-use of nuclear weapons in 
local war is to the advantage of the United States involves 
three separable problems. 3 First, what effect would a non-use 
declaration have on the deterrence of local wars? Second, 
would it be to the tactical military advantage of the United 
States to introduce nuclear weapons in any or all local wars? 
Third, would the use of nuclear weapons increase the likelihood 
that a local war would become global to the detriment of American 
interests? The discussion of the battlefield implications of 
the nuclear weapons will assume symmetrical use by both sides. 
Following this, I will consider briefly the possibility of 
unilateral use by the United States, particularly against the 
Chinese. 
For a number of years the accepted doctrine, both among 
the military officers and some private students of national 
security policy, has been that the use of nuclear weapons in 
a local war would be to the battlefield advantage of the United 
States. Very recently, the climate of opinion in official circles 
3For a more extended discussion of this question, see 
Morton H. Halperin, "Nuclear Weapons and Limited War, n The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution (June, 1961), pp. 146-66. 
5 
has changed with the belief that much greater emphasis must be 
put on conventional forces. And the consensus among private 
students has grown to the point where there are very few remaining 
advocates of the use of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the view 
that nuclear weapons are to the battlefield advantage of the 
United States remains strong, at least in some parts of the 
military establishment and among some of America's allies. In 
addition, a number of those who oppose the use of nuclear 
weapons do so almost entirely on the ground that a nuclear 
local war could not be stable, and not because of any analysis 
of the battlefield implications of their use. Thus, it may be 
worth at least briefly reviewing the reasons why it appears that 
the symmetrical use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield of a 
local war is not to the advantage of the United States. 
Perhaps the best way to proceed is to consider first those 
hypotheses which have been advanced which suggEst that the 
United States and the West would gain a tactical advantage by 
the use of nuclear weapons. These propositions are: 1) that 
nuclear weapons permit the saving of manpower, 2) that they are 
more valuable to the defense than the offense, and 3) that the 
United States can develop a superior arsenal for fighting a 
battlefield nuclear war. 
1. The assertion that the use of nuclear weapons in a 
limited war would result in a saving of manpower seems to be 
contrary to the fact. 4 It is likely to be true that if both 
sides use nuclear weapons, the number of troops required to 
hold an area will increase rather than decrease. High attrition 
rates which would be inevitable with the use of nuclear weapons 
would put a great premium on reserves, and while it is true that 
units would have to be smaller and more dispersed, it does not 
mean that the number of units will not be a crucial variable. S 
4It should also be noted that it is by no means clear that 
the United States is faced with a manpower disadvantage at least 
in every area of the world. The problem is one of willingness 
to reduce the comforts of the men in uniform, and perhaps to 
increase draft levels. 
SIn a nuclear war in which both sides used large numbers 
of nuclear weapons in a small area, manpower may, in fact, become 
irrelevant since the battle area would be completely destroyed. 
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2. The argument that nuclear weapons provide a strategic 
advantage for the defense also seems to be contrary to the fact. 
It is generally accepted that in conventional warfare there is 
a major advantage to the defensive side; something like a three-
to-one ratio is generally required to launch a successful offensive 
action with conventional forces. Nuclear weapons, particularly if 
they are mobile, as they now are, might drastically alter this 
ratio, making it possible for forces of the same size or perhaps 
even smaller to make major offensive breakthroughs. It is generally 
argued that nuclear weapons prevent the massing of troops necessary 
for offensive action. However, while the massing is necessary 
for conventional offensive action, it is by no means clear that 
with the use of nuclear weapons this would in fact be the case. 6 
It should also be noted that, regardless of how the intro-
duction of nuclear weapons affects the offense-defense equilibrium, 
it is· by no means clear that the United States will always be on 
the defensive in a local war. In some situations it may be seeking 
to recover ground lost in the opening days of a local war, and in 
some situations it may be seeking to fight a guerrilla group in 
which case there may be no offense or defense at all. 
3. Finally, there is the argument that the United States has 
the capacity to develop a tactical nuclear arsenal superior to 
that of the Soviet Union. In part, this argument represents a 
lag from the time when the United States in fact had a tactical 
nuclear capability superior to the Soviets. But there is no 
reason to suppose that the Communists cannot put resources into 
the relatively narrow area of the development of nuclear weapons 
sufficient to equal the arsenal of the United States. In fact, 
even without further testing, both sides probably now appear to 
have arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons sufficient for all 
conceivable local-war situations. 7 
6In contrast to the discus&ion of tactical problems involv-
ing conventional forces, there are two difficulties in discussing 
the tactical use of nuclear weapons. First and foremost, nobody 
has ever fought a tactical nuclear battle. In addition to that 
there is no clear consensus as to what a tactical nuclear battlefield 
might look like. For a discussion of the alternative conceptions of 
a nuclear battlefield, see "Nuclear Weapons and Limited War,fT.2£. cit. 
7See Donald G. Brennan and Morton H. Halperin, npolicy Consider-
ations of a Nuclear Test Ban," in Brennan (ed.), Arms Control, 
Disarmament, and National Security (New York: George Braziller, 
Inc., 1961), pp. 253-57. 
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It is more likely that the United States, because of its 
larger GNP and its larger research and development budget, could 
develop a superior arsenal to the Soviets in the broad range 
of conventional weapons. In the field of logistics as well, it 
appears that the United States would gain a net strategic 
advantage if nuclear weapons were not used. Although there may 
be some exceptions,8 American supply lines,as they involve long 
distances and depend on ports and airfields, are more likely to 
be subject to destruction by the use of nuclear weapons . than 
are the interior lines of the Soviet Union and Communist China. 
Thus, it appears that focusing simply on the outcome of the 
battlefield military engagement does not make it clear that the 
United States would gain by the use of tactical nuclear weapons. 
And in fact, a general consideration of the problem suggests 
that the United States is likely to suffer a net loss if both 
sides symmetrically use nuclear weapons. Which side gains or 
loses is likely to depend on the particular aspects of a given 
situation. 
THE EFFECT ON STABILITY 
It seems clear that the use of nuclear weapons in a local 
war increases the likelihood that the war will become a general 
war. This is true partly because it erases one of the major 
boundaries between a local war and a general nuclear war, and 
partly because it increases the likelihood that the war would 
trigger a pre-emptive strike. Neither side has fought a local 
war using nuclear weapons and thus both would have to ask them-
selves the question whether this means that general war had 
become so inevitable that it was now necessary to pre-empt. 9 
It should be clear that I am not asserting that it is impossible 
to fight a limited nuclear war. I am merely saying that the use 
of nuclear weapons in a limited war will generate strong pressures 
which would make it less likely that the war would stay limited. 
The very uncertainty as to what nuclear limited war would be like, 
8For example, in parts of South and Southeast Asia, and in 
Latin America. 
9For a more extended discussion of this problem, see Morton 
H. Halperin, "Arms Control and Inadvertent General War,fT prepared 
for Project VULCAN, and "The Limiting Process TT (Mimeo),Harvard 
Center for International Affairs, 1961. 
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what its implication would be, increases the chances that the 
war would get out of hand and expand to general war. Thus, any 
side contemplating the use of nuclear weapons for battlefield 
reasons of the kinds discussed above must consider the possibility 
that the use of nuclear weapons will trigger a general war. Along 
with some of the points discussed above, as well as the notion 
that nuclear limited war is likely to lead to great destruction, 
the instability of nuclear limited war suggests that the United 
States and the Soviet Union have a mutual interest in avoiding 
the use of nuclear weapons. The uncertainty about the battle-
field implications of nuclear weapons plus the certainty that 
they will heighten the danger of general war may lead each side 
to believe that it is in its interest to refrain from their use. 
In this situation, one of the strongest motives for the use of 
nuclear weapons might be the fear that the other side was about 
to initiate their usee As is argued below, this may be one of 
the important reasons why this arms control proposal is of value. 
THE EFFECT ON THE DETERRENCE OF LOCAL AGGRESSION 
The question of what deters and what does not deter is a 
very complex and controversial one involving a number of 
psychological and political-military questions. Here we are 
concerned only with what is most likely to deter local military 
aggression. The problem is complicated by the fact that one 
must consider the deterring of a number of different potential 
adversaries: the RUSSians, the Chinese, and local Communist 
forces; and deterring them from a number of different kinds of 
actions: overt aggression, guerrilla warfare, coups, subversion, 
etc. For many of these situations, all forms of deterrence, 
including the threat to use nuclear weapons, are likely to be 
ineffective. One does not, for example, deter changes in the 
loyalty of local military groups by American threats to use, or 
American promises not to use, nuclear weapons. Thus, for a 
large number of the problems of local defense, the threat of the 
use or non-use of nuclear weapons is irrelevant. However, in the 
case of overt military aggression, the nuclear deterrent may be 
an important variable. 
If one believes that the threat of overt military aggression 
is a serious one, then it is important to ask whether the threat 
to intervene with nuclear weapons is a more effective deterrent 
than the threat to intervene with conventional forces. There are 
two aspects to the question of the effectiveness of the deterrent. 
The first is, does the enemy believe it; and the second is, how 
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serious does he think it will be if you carry out your deterrent 
threat. The threat of massive retaiiation, if credible, is 
effective in the sense that,if the other side really believes that 
one will retaliate massively, it does not take the action. On 
the other hand, a threat, for example, to intervene conventionally 
may be credible and not effective because the other side decides 
nevertheless to go ahead with the action. The threat to use 
nuclear weapons in a local area will in one sense increase the 
cost to the enemy of the action. It will increase the likelihood 
that the local war will become general war and will increase the 
expected physical destruction which the enemy will suffer. On 
the other hand, precisely because it increases the shared costs 
and shared risks of general war, the threat to intervene with 
nuclear weapons may reduce the credibility of the threat. That 
is, if the enemy comes to believe that the only way in which one 
can intervene is by using nuclear weapons, then he may believe 
that it is less likely that one will intervene. On the other 
hand, if both have accepted the rule that nuclear weapons will 
not be used, then intervention may appear to present less risk 
of triggering general war and hence may be more likely. Given 
the caution which even the Chinese Communists have shown in 
initiating overt warfare involving the United States, it 
appears that the credibility of the declaration to intervene 
with U.S. forces is more important than the nature of the 
intervention. It is more important to convince the Communists 
that the United States will intervene in a local war rather than 
to increase the nature of the cost if the intervention is carried 
out. For this reason, it seems likely that the threat to use 
nuclear weapons may decrease the deterrence threat, and a threat 
to intervene conventionally (since, as was argued, it can be made 
more credible), is more likely to deter overt Communist aggression. 
There are several exceptions to the general points made 
above which need to be made explicit. As was pointed out, there 
are likely to be a number of areas in the world which the United 
States is simply incapable of defending against determined Communist 
aggressiono In some of these situations the United States may 
want to fight simply to demonstrate its determination to fight in 
other areas and to increase the shared risk of general war as 
a way of deterring aggression. In this kind of situation, it 
may be of some value to explode a nuclear weapon as a way of 
demonstrating seriousness and resolve even if the West cannot 
win the local battle. On the other hand, the use of nuclear 
weapons in peripheral areas of this kind may appear to be too 
dangerous and the West may be more likely to risk intervention 
if it can do so conventionally with the expectation that the war 
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will in fact remain conventional. However, there will be a number 
of areas where this whole discussion is in some sense irrelevant 
since the United States will decide not to intervene in a local 
war. 
Secondly, there is the problem of whether or not all uses 
of nuclear weapons would be symmetrical, that is, whether the 
United States could use nuclear weapons against the Chinese or 
against local Communist forces without the Soviets supplying 
our battlefield enemies with the equivalent nuclear forces. 
The Chinese are likely to have at least a small atomic arsenal 
within a few years, but there will remain the questions of the 
Soviets adding to the arsenal and the Russians or Chinese 
supplying nuclear weapons to other Communist forces. It seems 
likely that the pressures on the Russians would be extremely 
great (and perhaps irresistible) to supply nuclear weapons, 
particularly to the Chinese, or to send a "volunteer" nuclear 
corps if the United States introduced these weapons on the 
battlefield. Whether or not nuclear weapons were shared quickly 
enough to be used on the immediate battlefield, the pressures 
on the Soviets for the sharing of nuclear weapons in the longer 
run would probably increase. Alternatively, the battlefield 
use of nuclear weapons by the United States might bring the 
Soviet Union into the war--compelled to intervene because its 
allies did not have the technical capability to use nuclear 
weapons. Such intervention could bring the world dangerously 
close to general war. It would seem rather risky and somewhat 
foolhardy to count on American unilateral use of nuclear weapons 
in any East-West encounter; increasing the expectation that 
nuclear weapons would not be used would reduce the pressure on 
the Soviet Union to share nuclear weapons with the Chinese or 
others of its allies, particularly during a tense battlefield 
crisis. 
Finally, there is the question as to whether or not,in 
~ome areas of the world, the us§ of tactical nuclear weapons 
lS not to the battlefield advantage of the United States. 
Before discussing this point very briefly, it should be noted 
that the other objections to the use of nuclear weapons would 
not be.erased~ In fact, they might be strengthened by the 
effectlve use of tactical nuclear weapons by the United States. 
In addition to increaSing the danger of inadvertent general war, 
there would be the costs involved in the great destruction 
caused by nuclear weapons and the United States would still 
suffer the political consequences of being the initiator of the 
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use of nuclear weapons. lO Thus, it may be true that,even in 
situations where the United States would gain a tactical military 
advantage by the use of nuclear weapons, it should refrain from 
doing so because of other broader political and military consider-
ations. No answer can, of course, be given to the question of 
whether or not the use of tactical nuclear weapons is to the 
advantage of the United States in a particular situation and 
particular geographic area without a detailed study of the situa-
tion which was alleged to give this advantage to the United 
States. Perhaps the situation most often cited as falling in 
this category is that of the defense of Formosa. But it is 
assumed that nuclear weapons would be used by both sides only 
in a very limited way dictated by the United States or used only 
by the United States. Given any general local use of nuclear 
weapons, Formosa is likely to be put out of commission very 
rapidly. Here again it would probably be foolhardy for the 
United States to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in the 
Formosa Straits on the assumptions that the Chinese will not 
be supplied with nuclear weapons by the Russians, or that, if 
they get nuclear weapons, they will use them with extreme 
caution and circumspection and against only naval targets. ll 
Having argued that the non-use of nuclear weapons in local 
wars would be to the political and military advantage of the 
United States (as well as sufficiently to the advantage of the 
Soviet Union) to suggest that there is some possibility of both 
sides observing such restraint, I turn now to the question of 
whether the proposed agreement will in fact increase the like-
lihood that nuclear weapons will not be used in a local war. 
It should first be noted that there exists now a powerful 
informal rule against the use of nuclear weapons. In none of 
the encounters between East and West since the Second World 
War has either side used nuclear weapons; in fact, one suspects 
that neither side has seldom, if ever, come close to the 
IOFor a discussion of these consequences, see TTNuclear 
Weapons and Limited War," QQ. cit. 
. ~l~ertainly this brief paragraph is not meant to be a 
deflnltl~e discussion of the possibility of using tactical nuclear 
weapo~s.ln the defense of Formosa. But it does reflect my extreme 
skeptlclsm that one can devise a means of using tactical nuclear 
weapons at any particular location which gives enough assurance 
of success to offset the political and military costs which would 
come from the first use of nuclear weapons. 
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decision to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Will this 
proposal enhance the existing rule and contribute to its 
stability, thus making it even less likely that nuclear weapons 
will be used in future limited wars? This is the real question. 
The answer seems to be yes. An agreement outlawing the use of 
nuclear weapons will in fact contribute to the likelihood that 
they will not be used. But the answer goes beyond the simple hope 
that nations will observe the agreements which they sign. 
The establishment of an agreement, particularly a formal 
one, creates an additional cost if the rule is violated. Not 
only must· each side calculate its costs and gains in using 
nuclear weapons, but it also must estimate the costs and gains 
in breaking an agreement in terms of establishing future 
agreements and in terms of its position in the eyes of its 
adversary, neutrals, and its allies. This may not be an over-
riding consideration but, in a close decision, it may be 
marginally crucial at least for the West. In addition, the 
proposal to break a treaty will probably force a more calculated 
decision. It will, even more than at present, de-emphasize the 
strictly military aspects of the decision and elevate the role 
of political decision-makers. In addition, an agreement will 
reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used in a local 
war because it will help dampen the pre-emptive urge which 
even in a local encounter is one of the strongest motives for 
the use of nuclear weapons. Since the side which uses nuclear 
weapons first is likely to gain an important advantage, one of 
the motives for use is the fear that the other side is about 
to use the weapons. If one becomes convinced that the nucleariza-
tion of the war is inevitable, then there is much to be gained 
on the battlefield by being the first to use the weapons. 12 
Thus, an agreement which reduced each side's expectation that 
nuclear weapons would be used by the other, an agreement by which 
each side Signalled to the other that it did not intend to use 
nuclear weapons, might be important in quelling the pre-emptive 
urge to use nuclear weapons. It might be valuable in discrediting 
the arguments of those who urge that nuclear weapons be used in 
order to anticipate their use by the other side. 
. An agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons may make an 
lmportant contribution to increasing the likelihood that nuclear 
l2Although the political costs of initiating the use of 
nuclear weapons are likely to be great and may to some extent 
counteract this tendency. 
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weapons will not be used in a local war. This will be particularly 
true if it is part of a combination of arms control proposals 
and unilateral actions aimed at reducing the likelihood of a 
nuclear limited war. 13 A declaration against the use of nuclear 
weapons may be a necessary component of such a program, partly 
because the program otherwise will seem to be lacking its capstone, 
if the United States refused to pledge that it will never initiate 
the use of nuclear weapons and did not seek such a pledge from the 
Soviets. It may also be true that,since the Soviets have continu-
ously been interested in securing the adoption of a proposal 
against the first use of nuclear weapons, they may well insist 
upon it or find it an attractive part of a package proposal on 
nuclear weapons. 
THE EFFECT ON THE INITIATION OF GENERAL WAR 
As was implied above, the major military effects of a decla-
ration against the use of nuclear weapons will be in the local 
war area. It does not seem likely that such agreements will have 
much of an effect on the decision to initiate general war. If 
one side decides that it needs to initiate general war, it is 
not likely to be deterred by the feeling that it will break the 
arms control agreement. In the aftermath of a general war 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, nobody is likely 
to remember or to care about the violation of that particular 
agreement. In addition, the pre-emptive urges which might lead 
to such a war are not likely to be quelled in this case by a 
pledge against the use of nuclear weapons. If general war 
comes quickly, nuclear weapons might inevitably be used unless 
much more drastic arms control measures were in effect. 
The main effect which this agreement might have on general 
war is to reduce the likelihood of its occurring inadvertently 
~uring a nuclear limited war. Any limited war might trigger 
lnadvertent general war, but a nuclear one is much more likely 
. 13Such a package is sketched briefly below. An alternative 
lS elaborate~ in Thornton Read, A Proposal to Neutralize Nuclear 
Weapons, POIlCY Memorandum No. 22, Princeton: Princeton Center 
of International Studies, 1961. 
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to do 50. Thus, any agreement which reduces the likelihood that 
nuclear weapons will be used in a limited war reduces the danger 
of inadvertent general war. 14 
14For an extended discussion of inadvertent general war and 
nuclear limited war as a trigger, see "Arms Control and Inadvertent 
General War," .2E. • cit. 
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CHAPTER IV 
POLITICAL EVALUATION 
As was suggested above, a major political objective of an 
agreement outlawing the use of nuclear weapons is to halt the 
spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. I will 
first consider very briefly whether this is a valuable objective, 
and whether or not this proposal might contribute to accom-
plishing it, and then will go on to consider some of the other 
possible effects of an agreement banning the use of nuclear 
weapons. 
Although a few commentators have attempted to make a 
contrary argument,lS most students of the problem have agreed 
that it would be worthwhile to try now to halt the spread of 
nuclear weapons to additional countries. The major argument 
is that the spread of nuclear weapons will significantly 
increase the possibility of an inadvertent general war because 
it will increase the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons 
in local wars and in the long run will complicate the problems 
of deterring general war. 
Small powers which have nuclear weapons might be more 
likely to use them than either of the two major powers. They 
lSFor the best example, see Fred C. Ikle, "Nth Countries 
and Disarmament," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist XVI 
(December, 1960), pp. 391-94. 
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may, for example, use them in local areas, non-East-West conflicts, 
but in a way which may cause the conflict to grow into general 
war~ In addition, an irresponsible dictator could do a good deal 
of damage with even a few nuclear we~pons if he ~er7 willin~ to 
use them in a cold-blooded way, and If he were wllllng to rlsk 
great damage to his own country. The possibility of a series of 
blackmail attempts of this kind is not at all a pleasant one to 
contemplate. Finally, the ~pread of nuclear weapons to additional 
countries is dangerous because it may give them a false sense of 
security and deter them from developing adequate conventional 
forces to deal with their main military problems. 
Assuming that it would be in the interests of the United 
States to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to Nth countries, 
the question is: How does an agreement banning the first use 
of nuclear weapons contribute to this end? Perhaps the first 
thing to note is that even if it does not, such an agreement 
might neutralize some of the main dangers stemming from Nth country 
possession of nuclear weapons. If Nth p'owers could be induced 
to join or support an agreement against the use of nuclear weapons, 
there would be strong moral and political pressures on them not 
to use such weapons in local encounters and especially not to 
engage in forms of nuclear blackmail. And insofar as the two 
major powers were prepared to enforce jointly an agreement 
against the non-use of nuclear weapons, they would have a power-
ful check on irresponsible use of nuclear weapons by Nth 
countries. Partly for just this reason, an agreement against 
the use of nuclear weapons may contribute to halting the 
diffusion of nuclear capabilities. If the small powers become 
convinced that the major powers will not permit them to use 
n~clear weapons, if they recognize that they will be forced to 
slgn and observe an agreement banning the use of both the 
~eapon~ and the threat of the use, they may have much less 
l~ce~tlve to acquire a nuclear capability. In addition, the 
slgnang of an agreement against the use of nuclear weapons 
and other measures aimed at strengthening the likelihood that 
the.other major powers will not depend on nuclear forces for 
thelr defense may be an important signal to the smaller powers 
that nuclear capabilities are not an effective method of 
defense. 
There is a contrary trend, however, which suggests that, 
at least under certain Circumstances, a U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement 
not to use nuclear weapons might in fact trigger the diffusion 
of nuclear weapons to other countries. A number of countries 
throughout the world depend on American military forces for their 
17 
security. A number of these, particularly European countries 
such as Germany, feel that the only capability with which the 
United States can adequately defend them is the American nuclear 
force. The sudden stripping away of the nuclear defense may 
make them feel naked and create strong pressures for them to 
attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. Only.if America~s allies 
are convinced that they can be defended wlth conventlonal 
forces can the significant costs which would come from American 
renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons be offset. 
These costs would be of two kindso First, there would be the 
feeling on the part of the allies that they had been deserted by 
the United StatesG Since they probably would not, under the 
circumstances, concur in the agreement, the United States 
would have made a unilateral agreement with the Soviet Union 
contrary to their wishes. In addition, the likely reaction of 
the West European powers may be to attempt to create independent 
or international, but non-NATO,nuclear force.s, for their defense. 
Ideally, the signing of the agreement should trigger or be 
accompanied (or perhaps preceded) by the creation of larger and 
more adequate conventional forces. But until the European powers 
and other U.S. allies become convinced that conventional forces 
can prove adequate for their defense against a conventional 
attack, the reaction to a non-use agreement is likely to be 
towards a lessened conventional force effort in order to devote 
additional resources to the development of independent nuclear 
capabilities. 
The difficulties involved in this problem are hard to over-
estimateo The Europeans, particularly the Germans and the 
French, have become c~vinced over a number of years, partly 
as a result of America's actions and American analysis, that 
the use of nuclear weapons is a way of avoiding the use or 
need of large conventional forces, and is an effective way of 
defending them. This has become so engrained in their military 
and strategic thinking that it will be very difficult to alter. 
To some extent, the problem is an intellectual one. It can be 
solved in part by exposing the Europeans to the kind of analysis 
of th~ value and problems of the use of nuclear weapons which 
has been carried on in the United Statese But the problem is 
prob~bl~ much more political than intellectual--the problem of 
convlnclng the Europeans that we are prepared to defend them, 
that the abandonment of nuclear weapons is an action designed to 
enhance their security and not to detract from it for some ulterior 
American purpose. If this can be done, an agreement banning the 
use of nuclear weapons might be an important symbol of the agreement 
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of the West to improve its conventional forces and might be a 
valuable stimulant to overcoming the opposition of other groups 
within the allied countries. In its absence a U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
agreement against the use of nuclear weapons may well trigger 
the diffusion of nuclear weapons, rather than bringing it to a 
halt. 
Apart from the effect on the decision of allied nations and 
neutrals to acquire or not to acquire a nuclear capability, there 
will be other important political effects of an agreement banning 
the use of nuclear weapons. In relation to the Soviet Union, 
the negotiating of such an agreement may (or may not) open the 
way to further arms control. Since the Soviets have traditionally 
been interested in this agreement it may be possible to couple 
it with an arms control agreement of interest to the United 
States. This possibility should not be exaggerated. The Soviets 
might well refuse to sign any agreement except one which embodied 
their plan for general and complete disarmament. American willing-
ness to sign the agreement at this time, however, followed by 
many years of refusal even seriously to consider it, may give 
another message to the Soviets. It may suggest to them, and 
perhaps particularly to the Chinese, an increased American fear 
of nuclear war and hence a decreased American willingness to 
intervene in local area warfare. The Communists may view an 
American proposal of such an agreement, whether formal or 
informal, as a signal that the United States was retrenching, was 
preparing to withdraw its commitments to overseas areas. Since 
it may be true that the fear that the United States would use 
nuclear weapons has in fact deterred the Chinese, in particular, 
from launching overt military aggression in areas along their 
border, the signing of an agreement banning the use of nuclear 
weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union might be a 
signal for renewed Chinese aggression. The Soviets, less fearful 
that the local. aggression would trigger a nuclear general war 
because the use of nuclear weapons had become less likely, may be 
more willing to sanction overse9s aggression by the Chinese. Here 
again, the crucial variable may be what additional steps the 
United States takes. 
As has already been suggested, AmericaTs allies are likely 
to look upon this agreement with serious misgivings. If it is 
an informal bilateral agreement, it may raise the old fears of 
a direct accord between the two super powers at the expense of 
their allies. 
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Apart from the effect on their decision whether or not to 
build nuclear weapons, neutralist nations are likely to respond 
favorably to an American initiative to ban the use of nuclear 
weapons. Probably without carefully considering the strategic 
implications, most neutrals have been pressing for such an 
agreement and would probably welcome an American initiative in 
this field. 
It is difficult to draw a balance sheet of the political 
and military effects of a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. 
It depends very much on what else is done. Possible complementary 
steps will be discussed below, but it should be noted that the 
proposal in any case should reduce the likelihood of a nuclear 
limited war and hence the danger of inadvertent general war. 
There will inevitably be costs associated with the reaction of 
America's allies and gains, if slight, in terms of the 
propaganda battle in the uncommitted nations. However, the 
balancing of the costs and gains can only be done if one 
considers concurrent unilateral and arms control measures. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCURRENT ACTION 
As was suggested above, the renunciation by the United States 
and the Soviet Union 0.£ the use of nuclear weapons would have a 
marginal, if perhaps crucial, effect on whether or not nuclear 
weapons would be used in a local war, but it might not contrib-
ute to halting the diffusion of nuclear weapons to additional 
countries. The actual impact of the agreement will depend on 
what is done concurrently and how the agreement is proposed, 
negotiated, and implemented. Concurrent acti0n in three fields--
arms control, unilateral military polic~ and diplomacy--will be 
discussed. 
With the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing in September, 
1961, there is little likelihood of a test ban in the near 
future, so I turn to other arms control measures. 
A comprehensive program to control nuclear weapons might 
include a cut-off of nuclear production, reduction of stockpiles, 
confining nuclear weapons to the territory of the United States 
and the Soviet Union, and an agreement not to share fissionable 
material or nuclear know-how with other countries. Without 
seeking to analyze any of these extensively, I would argue that 
they all appear to be in the interest of the United States and 
might as a unit effectively halt the spread of nuclear weapons 
and Significantly reduce the likelihood of their use in a local 
war. Each of these proposals should be subjected to an extensive 
analysis before it can be determined if it in fact would contribute 
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to American security. Some of these might, of course, be easier 
to negotiate than others--or all might be beyond the realm of 
possibility. 
Some of these steps might be taken unilaterally either with 
the aim of inducing reciprocation or because they are valuable 
in themselves independent of the Russian response. There is 
already in effect a tacit agreement against the sharing of 
nuclear technology which might well remain in force even if not 
translated into a formal agreement. An unsuccessful attempt, 
however, to negotiate a formal agreement might corrode the tacit 
understanding and lead to nuclear sharing. The cut-off of production 
and the removal of nuclear weapons, at least from forward areas, 
deserve serious consideration as a unilateral step. 
The removal of nuclear weapons from front line troops could 
be done in a way which would not impair the ability of the U.S. 
to wage a nuclear limited war, but which would improve the 
chanc~s of a local war remaining non-nuclear. Involved here is 
the question of how to develop dual-purpose forces. The Army and 
many analysts have suggested forces that can fight equally well 
with or without nuclear weapons as the TTidealTT solution. There 
are major problems, however, in actually sending a force into 
combat equipped to fight both conventionally and with nuclear 
weapons. If such a force were supplied with nuclear weapons, 
it might ultimately use them under the strains of the battle 
without authority to do so. Two alternatives are possible. One 
is to have stand-by forces equipped with nuclear weapons should 
the United States engage in a conventional limited war; the other 
is to plan on restricting the use of nuclear weapons to support-
ing units outside the battlefield area, that is, by tactical air 
forces and by short-range missiles. The major problem in such 
use is that it may lead to an expansion of the war into areas 
from which the nuclear weapons are coming. This problem might be 
overcome in part by flying planes carrying nuclear weapons from 
aircraft carriers. The United States has adopted the policy of 
seeking to equip its troops to fight both with tactical nuclear 
weapons and without--this seems to be the worst alternative. 
Thus, I would argue that the removal of nuclear weapons from 
front line troops enhances American security independent of any 
agreement with the Soviet Union. This does not mean that the 
United States should necessarily carry out the step unilaterally. 
The Russians seem to be seriously interested in keeping atomic 
weapons out of German hands and it may be possible to get some 
concession from them--perhaps area inspection--as part of an 
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agreement which kept nuclear weapons out of Germany. Much of the 
unilateral benefit could be gained by moving nuclear weapons 
off the front lines, but not necessarily removing them from 
Germany. 
A unilaterial renunciation of production might generate some 
pressure on the Russians to conform. But even by itself it would 
be a further signal of America's interest in neutralizing nuclear 
weapons and its desire to avoid the use of nuclear weapons if 
possibleG Whether in the long run the United States could afford 
to abstain unilaterally from production depends on a number of 
technical (and classified) factors including developments in 
anti-missile technology. 
One. additional unilateral military step needs to be dis-
cussed. That is the strengthening of conventional forces. 
However, one point needs to be emphasized. From the standpoint 
of actually fighting a local war, even with present conventional 
force levels, the United States would be better off if both sides 
refrain from using nuclear weapons. Allied conventional forces 
are now too small (and are poorly equipped) partly as a result 
of the belief that nuclear weapons are a substitute for man-
power; but, as was argued above, with any given ratio of forces, 
the United States does not gain (and probably loses) if both sides 
introduce nuclear weapons on the battlefield. Having said thiS, 
it is important to stress nonetheless the advisability, both from 
a military and political point of view, of strengthening American 
and allied conventional forces. Not only would this be an addi-
tional signal reinforcing a pledge of non-use of nuclear weapons, 
but it would also be important in reassuring our allies that the 
non-use pledge did not imply that we were not prepared to defend 
them. 
The strengthening of American conventional forces should be 
accompanied by a strong diplomatic and propaganda effort stressing 
America's determination to halt the spread of nuclear weapons 
and outlaw their use, and at the same time stressing equally its 
determination to stand by its commitments to defend its allies. 
An effort should also be made to make clear to our allies that it 
would increase America's capacity to intervene in local war as 
well as the capacity to do so without touching off a general war. 
Even without other formal arms control steps, an agreement 
on non-use of nuclear weapons coupled with the unilateral steps 
sketched above might be sufficient to halt the spread of nuclear 
weapons and might reduce substantially the likelihood of a nuclear 
local war e 
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